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The productive potential and limits of landscape 
conflicts in light of Ralf Dahrendorf ’s conflict 
theory
Olaf Kühne, Florian Weber, Karsten Berr
Abstract. Ralf Dahrendorf ’s conflict theory posits social conflict as, under certain cir-
cumstances, productive. Working from a constructivist view of language, we ask to what 
extent this applies to the conflicts currently arising around the social construct of «land-
scape», either from different interpretations of that concept or from different evaluations 
of the physical manifestations of human activity to which it refers. Are such conflicts 
socially productive? How can they become so? Our theoretical premises are clarified in a 
review of recent empirical inquiries into the German energy transition, a national under-
taking which – following the political decision to exit nuclear-powered energy produc-
tion by 2022 – has turned into a central field of social conflict, due to the ensuing mas-
sive growth not only of alternative power plants but also of electricity transmission net-
works. Regarding controversy in this context as normal, and eschewing simple solutions, 
we argue for the importance of recognizing opposing interests as legitimate, not catego-
rizing opposition as per se immoral, agreeing rules of procedure, and accepting decisions 
that abide by those rules. Conclusions are drawn for both theory and practice. 
INTRODUCTION:  
«LANDSCAPE CONFLICTS» AS POTENTIALLY PRODUCTIVE 
Conflicts involving the term «landscape» – whether with regard to alter-
native energy sourcing (wind power, biomass, photovoltaics) and its trans-
portation, or to suburban expansion, the development of airports, highways, 
and railroad facilities, and the extraction of sand or gravel – have recently 
gained new social relevance (Kühne and Weber 2018 [online 2017]; see also 
e.g. Bues and Gailing 2016; Gailing and Leibenath 2015; Weber et al. 2018; 
Kühne 2018b). While advocates of such projects frequently argue that they 
are «landscape compatible», opponents tend – often vociferously – to see 
them as destroying or defacing «landscape» and «homeland».
Starting from an empirical analysis of patterns of argument, and apply-
ing a distinction based on Ralf Dahrendorf ’s theory of the normality of 
social conflict, we ask whether and under what circumstances such «land-
scape conflicts» can be deemed productive and, conversely, when they must 
be regarded as socially dysfunctional (Dahrendorf1* 1957, 1969b, 1972, 1992 
1 For reasons of economy, references to Dahrendorf ’s publications are cited hereafter by year and 
page only.
78 Olaf Kühne, Florian Weber, Karsten Berr
[in German], 2015 [1959], 2017 [in English]; see also: 
Kühne 2017b, 2018a; Gratzel 1990; Matys and Brüse-
meister 2012; Niedenzu 2001; Horowitz 2001 [1985]). 
Following Dahrendorf ’s (1972) reflections on this point, 
we further inquire into the conditions for establishing 
rules governing conflict procedure in landscape disputes.
In the tradition of social-constructivist landscape 
research (see e.g. Greider and Garkovich 1994; Cosgrove 
1984; Kühne 2006, 2008b, 2018d; Fontaine 2017; Kühne 
2018b; Weber 2016), we view landscape as an individual 
construct based on social patterns of interpretation and 
evaluation extending to both symbols and their mate-
rial objects. Accordingly, the concept has (1) social, (2) 
individual, and (3) physical-material levels, which in any 
combination may cause conflict. The clash of irreconcil-
ably different evaluations, each compelling from its own 
logical perspective, may well generate more heat than 
light. In these circumstances conflict theory can offer 
more productive perspectives.
After this brief introduction into the issue and its 
conceptual framework, we will first outline Dahrendorf ’s 
theory before presenting the conflicts arising around the 
concept of landscape in the German energy transition. 
Reflecting Dahrendorf ’s emphasis on practical rather 
than purely theoretical thinking (see e.g. 1972: 10), his 
axioms will then be applied to that context. Finally, the 
functional and dysfunctional potentials of current land-
scape conflicts in Germany will be examined, high-
lighting the topicality of Dahrendorf ’s insights and the 
unique value of his legacy.
DAHRENDORF ON SOCIAL CONFLICT
Active not only as a sociologist, but also as a poli-
tician, university manager, and many-sided journal-
ist (2002; Brietzke 2010), Dahrendorf frequently faced 
conflict situations. One far-reaching conclusion he drew 
from his experience was that «present-day liberal socie-
ties» tended to overlook the value of conflict (1972: 20). 
He developed his theory in opposition both to the struc-
tural functionalism of Talcott Parsons (1991 [1951]) and 
to Karl Marx’s interpretation of conflict as inherently 
revolutionary (2014 [1872]). For Dahrendorf, the struc-
tural functionalist view of society as «a relatively sta-
ble system of parts playing a predetermined role within 
that system» ignores «the element of movement, con-
flict and change», and hence «fails to do justice, on the 
theoretical-analytical level, to the essentially processual 
nature of social reality» (1968b: 238-239; see also Staub-
mann and Wenzel 2000). In effect, it overlooks both the 
changeability of society and the forces driving it onward 
(1996: 279; see also e.g. Münch 2004: 347). Dahrendorf 
shares Marx’s view of conflict as in principle productive, 
but criticizes his concept of society and the way conflicts 
develop (1952, 1961, 1968b, 1969c, 1972), specifically the 
idea that the path to communism via (bloody) revolu-
tion, as «the product of natural force or divine provi-
dence», is inevitable (1952: 13). As a liberal, Dahrendorf 
rejects communism both for its propagation of a class-
less society – which as such lacks the conflict that ena-
bles both social and individual development – and for 
its belief that fundamental social conflict can only be 
resolved by revolution and bloodshed. For Dahrendorf, 
only non-violent conflict is productive. Moreover, he 
rejects the concept of an «oppressed class» as reduction-
ist (1968b: 289). In contrast to both Parsons and Marx 
he sees society as continuously subject to change and 
therefore – given the immanent factors of power and 
political governance and the differences in office and 
rank these entail – to conflict; conversely, (non-violent) 
conflict is productive when it generates useful change 
(1961: 210, 1972: 30, 1996: 284; see also Bonacker 1996: 
65; Gratzel 1990: 19; Münch 2004: 348). Dahrendorf 
sees the root cause of social conflict in the antagonism 
between forces advocating continuation of the status quo 
and those seeking progress (1957; Bonacker 2009; Küh-
ne 2017b). At the core of such conflicts are two oppos-
ing drives: on the one hand to gain and on the other to 
obstruct electoral opportunity, access, and choice. Con-
flict is about «the right to participate and to enjoy the 
goods and activities on offer» (2007: 44; see also e.g. 
1957, 1972).  
Social conflicts vary in intensity and violence (1972). 
Intensity – a measure of social relevance –  «is high 
when, for those concerned, a lot depends on the outcome 
and the price of defeat is high» (1972: 38; see also 1965b). 
A conflict will, therefore, grow in intensity the more 
importance is attached to it. The violence of a conflict 
can range from peaceful discussion to revolution and 
world war:
War, civil war, and armed conflict imperiling the lives of 
those involved probably marks the one extreme; conversa-
tion, discussion, and negotiation observing the conventions 
of politeness and open argumentation the other. Between 
them lies a multiplicity of more or less violent modes of 
group conf lict – from strikes, tournaments, venomous 
debate, and fisticuffs, to trickery, threat, and ultimatum 
etc. etc. (1972: 37; see also 2004: 21).
Of particular intensity as well as violence, accord-
ing to Dahrendorf (1972), are conflicts conducted across 
various dimensions, for example when economic, politi-
cal, cultural/religious, and educational aspects converge 
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– e.g. relative poverty with political disempowerment, 
religious differences, and barriers to full participation in 
the educational system. The classical example for Dah-
rendorf was the Northern Ireland conflict (1968b), but 
many similar conflicts exist today, especially in societies 
with clear majority/minority relationships. Other essen-
tial aspects of a conflict are its complexity and spatial 
range: the more groups and institutions are party to a 
conflict, and the more spatial levels, from global to local, 
it embraces, the harder it is to gain a clear overview of 
the issues and processes at stake (1972; Kühne 2017b, 
2018a; Weber 2018a).
These four factors – intensity, violence, complexity, 
and spatial range – serve Dahrendorf as conceptual tools 
with which to differentiate and analyze conflicts at any 
specific point in time. But social conflicts do not arise 
out of nothing, they have a history, and Dahrendorf 
(1972) distinguishes three phases in their genesis:
1. Taking up a concept of Talcott Parsons (1991 [1951]), 
he sees the structural origins of a conflict in the 
development of latent (quasi-)interest groups, as yet 
without formal organization, whose members share 
the expectation of opting for one side or another of a 
specific issue (1972: 35).
2. As awareness of the interests in question grows, the 
quasi-groups will become more distinct and struc-
tured; they will make demands, develop programs, 
and formulate goals. Classical examples of such 
interest groups are associations, political parties, 
and trade unions (1996).
3. As goals become more concrete and interests inten-
sify, the level of organization of the various parties 
will increase, and with it their «visible self-identity» 
(1972: 36). The conflict issue will dichotomize, and 
at the same time cause internal divisions in the par-
ties involved (1972). The conflict will now be «open 
and visible» (1972: 36) and can gain ever greater rel-
evance for the society (or societies) concerned.
When it comes to procedures for dealing with con-
flicts, Dahrendorf (1972) notes three distinct approach-
es, only one of which, however, he considers potentially 
productive. Suppression of a conflict removes neither the 
issue itself nor its cause, as to prevent the formation of 
conflicting groups and the expression of their interests 
will only enhance the virulence of the conflict and the 
danger of violent escalation. Likewise, complete dissolu-
tion of a conflict entails removal of the social differences 
underlying it; but this is neither feasible nor desirable, 
for differences in rank and order are – as noted above – 
essential to the dynamism of society. Dahrendorf (1972) 
therefore favors a third approach: conflict regulation. 
This has four aspects:
1. Basic rights: social conflict is normal and legitimate 
and no party should be denied the right to express 
and pursue its lawful interests.
2. Concretization: the focus should be on the imme-
diate manifestations, not the underlying causes or 
overall social framework of a conflict.
3. Organization: regulation can proceed more efficient-
ly with conflicting parties that are well organized, 
with spokespersons, agendas etc.
4. Rule-keeping: based on acceptance of the right of 
the opposing party to hold and express their differ-
ent view, conflicting parties should agree potentially 
fruitful rules of procedure excluding, for example, 
insistence on unattainable maximum demands.
The «rational control of social conflicts» is, for Dah-
rendorf, «one of the central tasks of politics» (1972: 44). 
It operates on two levels: the national political, in the 
resolution of conflict by peaceful change of elected gov-
ernment in a constitutional democracy, rather than by 
violent revolution; and the general, in the framework 
provided by politics for the regulation of social conflicts 
outside the immediately political sphere (1992, 1990, 
1972; for further comments on Dahrendorf ’s conflict 
theory see e.g. Niedenzu 2001; Bonacker 1996; Lamla 
2008; Kühne 2017b).
The non-violent regulation of conflicts is, accord-
ing to Dahrendorf, closely bound up with the liberal 
democratic mode of governance, for this enables social 
demands to be transformed into political action. Follow-
ing Max Weber’s definition of power as the opportunity 
to impose one’s will even against opposition, he sees the 
specific quality of governmental – as opposed to gener-
al – power in «the sustained institutionalized action of 
a superordinate in relation to a subordinate person or 
group, […] presupposing a minimum of acceptance and 
compliance» (Imbusch 2002: 172; see also Dahrendorf 
1972). The superordinate actor is expected to control the 
behavior of the subordinate, including sanctioning devi-
ation from social norms; for effective governance itself 
presupposes: 
a system of legal and quasi-legal norms» (1972: 33). An 
advantage of liberal democracy, in this view, lies precisely in 
the way it enables power to be transformed into governance, 
regulates governance itself by checks and balances, and 
legitimates it by free, individual, and secret ballot (1980, 
1987, 2003): «Authority is never good […]. But it is more tol-
erable the clearer the source of its actions and its controlling 
instance (Kreuzer, Hayek and Dahrendorf 1983: 69).
The analytic as well as practical potential of these 
fundamental reflections on conflict, power, and govern-
ance will be illustrated in the following sections with 
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reference to conflicts invoking the concept of landscape 
in the context of the German energy transition.
LANDSCAPE AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT IN THE 
GERMAN ENERGY TRANSITION:  
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Introductory remarks
After the Fukushima reactor disaster of March 2011, 
Germany took the political decision to run down its 
nuclear power stations by 2022. Renewably sourced ener-
gy types – hydro, biomass, wind, photovoltaic, and geo-
thermally generated electricity – had already long been 
supported by the provisions of the Grid Feed-In Tariffs 
Act of 1991 and the Renewable Energy Sources Act of 
2000 (see e.g. Gochermann 2016; Economist 7.27.2012; 
Gailing and Moss 2016). Now, however, energy transi-
tion goals became more ambitious: renewables were 
to provide 40-45% of the country’s electrical energy 
requirement by 2025, and 55-60% of the total by 2035 
(Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
2016: 6). A glance at Fig. 1 shows the massive change 
this has caused in the country’s electrical power genera-
tion: in 1991 renewables contributed only 3.2%, by 2001 
this had more than doubled to 6.6%, and by 2015 it had 
risen to 30.0% of the total. Over the same period coal, 
lignite and nuclear generated power dropped accord-
ingly.
The energy transition has brought with it a counter-
movement to the Fordist focus on big centralized power 
stations in the form of a decentralization of electrical 
energy production. A small number of large companies 
has given way to a large number of smaller, more scat-
tered providers (Klagge 2013; Plankl 2013) based espe-
cially in rural areas. According to the Federal Institute 
for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial 
Development, in 2011 more than half of all photovolta-
ic power, almost 70% of that from biomass and biogas, 
and just over three-quarters of all wind generated power 
came from plants situated in rural areas that were clas-
sified either as «sparsely populated» or as «undergoing 
incipient population growth» (Plankl 2013: 12). 
Moreover, to transport (especially wind generated) 
electricity from North to South Germany, new power 
transmission lines are needed. In accordance with legal 
prescriptions and resultant planning targets – both 
before and increasingly after Fukushima – some 8,000 
km are already under construction or planned, either as 
overhead lines or as buried cabling (see Neukirch 2014; 
Riegel and Brandt 2015; Weber et al. 2017b; Federal Net-
work Agency 2017).
Projects of this order have wide social impact. Their 
highly visible manifestations – especially wind farms 
and new overhead grid lines and pylons – are unsettling 
to many people and have engendered growing resistance 
and conflict. Institutions, project managers, and munici-
pal authorities face civil protest directed either against 
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Figure 1. Gross electrical power generation in Germany since 1991 by energy source, with goals for 2025 and 2035 (Weber et al. 2016: 221)
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the energy transition as such against or its local forms, 
or advocating alternative forms of realization – e.g. wind 
energy for the windy north, photovoltaics for the sunny 
south, and grid extension only with buried cabling (for 
further details see Kühne and Weber 2018 [online 2017]; 
Weber et al. 2017a). 
Objections raised in the course of this protest regu-
larly refer to the concept of landscape and the physical 
changes to which it is subjected, and the allied concept 
of homeland or home environment – a conjunction 
around which feelings readily escalate, but are corre-
spondingly difficult to pacify. Our investigation of this 
complex focuses on the impact of these emotionally 
charged concepts on the argumentation of CIs (citizens’ 
initiatives), and the consequences that arise for the regu-
lation (in Dahrendorf ’s sense) of ensuing conflicts. For 
grid extension, our focus is on 123 CIs whose website 
or Facebook profile was identified in a Google Internet 
search of May-June 2017 (cited here as CI-G-001‒123). 
For wind power, we surveyed a total of 280 CIs in 
December 2015-January 2016, of which we use 270 that 
oppose various projects in this area (cited as CI-W-001-
270; for greater detail see Weber 2018a: section 5.3.2). 
To enhance the detail, and with it the cogency, of these 
results we further present interviews from two case 
studies whose protagonists take a fundamental stance 
against key aspects of the German energy transition:
1. Hormersdorf‒Mittelfranken (Bavaria) CI against grid 
extension: case study based on a March 2015 inter-
view with a representative of that organization (cited 
as CI-G interview) and scrutiny of their May 2017 
website (cited as CI-G website).
2. Citizens for Transparency and Justice (Bavaria) CI 
against wind farm extension: case study based on an 
October 2016 interview with a representative of that 
organization (cited as CI-W interview) and scrutiny 
of their May 2017 website (cited as CI-W website).
Landscape and homeland in the argumentation of CIs 
In both contexts – grid as well as wind farm exten-
sion – the conjunction of arguments based on consid-
erations of Heimat (≈homeland) and Landschaft (≈land-
scape) is very high in comparison with other arguments 
presented on the web or Facebook pages of CIs (see Fig-
ure 2, and in greater detail Weber 2018a, 2018b). Only 
in the wind farm context do arguments based on eco-
logical and environmental considerations occur more fre-
quently. «Landscape» and «homeland» are cited in more 
than 80% of the argumentation against grid extension, 
and here ecological and environmental considerations 
can be interpreted as masked grounds for the preserva-
tion of a physical space seen as integral to «home» and 
its received, familiar landscape. Landscape and homeland 
have, then, rapidly assumed a central position in the con-
flicts emerging from the German energy transition. In 
the setting of a modern industrial country, where on the 
one hand an adequate electrical power supply is of exis-
tential importance and on the other citizens enjoy – not 
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Figure 2. Key areas of argumentation of CIs against grid and wind 
farm expansion (own survey and chart)
Excerpt from the website of CI Sinngrund (CI-G-040): 
«Just come and look at our richly wooded landscape between 
Rhön and Spessart, whose characteristics and future your exist-
ing South-Link plans seek to permanently damage».
Excerpt from the website of CI Sulztal-Mühlhausen-Opf gegen 
Stromautobahn (Sulztal-Mühlhausen-Opf against the grid super-
highway: CI-G-013): «The corridor will lead to total destruction 
of our high value landscape profile. […] The topographical situ-
ation of the narrow Sulz Valley, already under excessive pressure 
from the Sulz floodplain and from a protected landscape area to 
the west, cannot cope with any further major incursions into the 
landscape».
Excerpt from the website of CI Pro Erdkabel Neuss (Neuss for 
buried cabling: CI-G-104)
«Technically, buried cabling is no problem, even for high and 
ultra-high voltages. With it, the landscape would survive grid 
extension optically unharmed. […] Current plans […] entail a 
massive incursion into our landscape profile».
Excerpt from the website of CI Fuldatal (CI-G-054):
«We want to stop this madness. […] Profit alone is driving grid 
and power corporations to destroy our homeland».
Excerpt from the website of CI Gegenstrom Elfershausen (Elfer-
shausen against grid extension: CI-G-008):
«We want to preserve our homeland and its cultural landscape».
Excerpt from the website of CI Altmühltal unter Strom (Altmüh-
ltal electrified: CI-G-036):
«We specifically reject the unnecessary South-East DC power 
corridor, because […] its huge pylons (more than 80m tall and 
40m wide) and massive scarring of the landscape will destroy 
both our landscape and homeland».
Text box 1. Citations of «landscape» and «homeland» on websites 
of CIs against grid extension (own compilation and emphasis)
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(see 1968a) – expanding educational opportunities and 
a corresponding ability to create powerful and articulate 
lobbies, conflict positions tend to harden into irreconcil-
able confrontation (see Kühne 2019 [forthcoming]).
In the grid extension context, the protection of the 
homeland and its familiar landscape from the intru-
sion of overhead power lines is proposed as a mainstay 
argument both by CIs urging radical structural change 
in the form of a decentralized regional energy transition 
(Weber et al. 2016) and by others content with propa-
gating the idea of buried cabling for the planned north-
south transmission corridor (see Text box 1). Behind this 
argumentation lies the sort of dichotomous construction 
Dahrendorf (1972, 1994 etc.) sees as typical of advanced 
conflicts (see also Kühne 2018a; Weber 2018a, 2018b): 
«our» attractive «home landscape», our «living environ-
ment», is arbitrarily threatened by power lines whose 
rationale is purely economic (never ecological!). Some of 
the terminology used here is also particularly revealing: 
Heimat and Landschaftsbild (≈landscape profile or char-
acter) imply respectively a normative and a stereotypical 
concept of landscape (see Kühne 2018b), and the latter 
term, drawn from the expert vocabulary of landscape 
professionals – Burckhardt (2004) calls this “officious” 
language – indicates, in Dahrendorf ’s eyes, a desire to be 
recognized by the opposing party as of equal status and 
as defending a serious cause in the conflict.
Similar arguments are adduced in the wind farm 
context (see Text box 2), with a focus on the preservation 
of a physical space interpreted as «cultural landscape» 
– a phrase also taken from expert vocabulary, with lit-
tle bearing on everyday usage. In effect, the landscape is 
here objectified into an entity endowed with an essence, 
developed over many generations, that is so deeply dis-
turbed by the presence of wind farms (also essential-
ist objects) that no renaturation measures can save it. 
Such positivist conceptions of landscape and homeland 
occur regularly in the argumentation of CIs, creating an 
irreconcilable, dichotomous picture in which local farm-
ing practice is assimilated to the conceptual complex of 
nature-landscape-homeland and wind farms are seen 
as an inherently transitional form of industrial energy 
production. The personal involvement of those direct-
ly affected enhances the intensity of the conflict and is 
reflected at times in the highly emotional language in 
which positions are expressed (see Text box 2). 
Landscape and homeland in the argumentation of Cis: two 
case studies 
The following case studies provide a sharper focus 
on regional situations in Southern Germany. Based on 
interviews with representatives of CIs, they show strik-
ing argumentative shifts that may significantly impact 
conflict regulation.
(1) Hormersdorf‒Mittelfranken (Bavaria) CI 
against the South-East grid extension corridor. The CI 
website explicitly sets the national energy transition in 
Excerpt from the website of Volksinitiative Rettet Brandenburg 
(«Save Brandenburg» people’s initiative: CI-W-078):
«Destruction of landscape and nature […] in excessive and 
unprecedented measure».
Excerpt from the website of CI Bad Marienberg, Westerwald 
(CI-W-235):
«The former profiles of the locality and landscape will be irre-
placeably destroyed […]. No renaturing program, however 
many millions it might cost, will be able to restore this unique 
protected landscape area. Marienberg Heights would be lost for-
ever».
Excerpt from the website of CI Gegenwind im Oderbruch (Oder 
Basin against wind power: CI-W-086):
«The Oder Basin is a unique cultural landscape worthy of pres-
ervation. These high wind turbines break up the wonderful 
wide-open spaces and will lead to the run-down of tourism in 
this region.». 
Excerpt from the website of CI Gegenwind Obergrombach-
Helmsheim-Kraichgau (Obergrombach-Helmsheim-Kraichgau 
against wind power: CI-W-034):
«Generations of us have worked to create our cultural landscape 
[…]. We have the privilege of living in it and the duty to pre-
serve it for coming generations. But we do not have the right to 
erect wind generation plant that will turn it into an industrial 
location and thus destroy it irremediably».
Excerpt from the website of CI Gegenwind Meckenheim-Rhein-
bach, Rhein-Sieg-Kreis (Meckenheim-Rheinbach, Rhein-Sieg dis-
trict against wind power:  CI-W-204):
«These wind turbines destroy our landscape – our home – our 
living space».
Excerpt from the website of CI zum Schutz des Hochschwar-
zwaldes (High Black Forest protection CI: CI-W-033): «The 
landscape of the Southern Black Forest and Upper Bregtal today 
is the fruit of centuries of cultivation and forest use by the local 
farming population. Over time, this has grown into an impres-
sive cultural landscape, a mosaic of open fields and woodland 
that is characteristic of the Southern Black Forest. Today the 
area is one of Germany’s most beautiful and most sought-after 
destinations for vacationing and recuperation: deep valleys, 
age-old farmsteads, flowering meadows, and dense forests – a 
unique blend of nature, culture, tradition and homeland […]. 
The plan to erect yet more gigantic, 200-meter-tall wind tur-
bines immediately next to the Upper Bregtal is the greatest 
threat this cultural landscape has suffered for more than 100 
years: it would destroy it forever».
Excerpt from the website of CI Windenergie Böhmfeld (Böh-
mfeld wind energy CI: CI-W-050): «We must not allow wide 
expanses of our homeland to be turned into a landscape devoted 
to the industrial generation of electricity».
Text box 2. Citations of «landscape» and «homeland» on websites of 
CIs against wind farm extension (own compilation and emphasis)
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its current form – with new transregional grid corridors 
– against the background of the homeland-landscape 
complex of arguments: «We seek to preserve our land-
scape and are convinced the energy transition can work 
differently» (CI-G website). A related meeting bore the 
heading «Homeland without monster power lines – for 
a real energy transition» (ibid.). Both texts show a clear 
positioning in favor of a new energy economy, but one 
with decentralized, regional production and storage of 
electricity (see Sontheim and Weber 2018) that would 
render long-distance north-south grid corridors obsolete. 
A similar passage combines concern for the loss of 
homeland – conceived as an essentialistic object – with 
other frequently cited arguments (see Figure 1): «The CI 
has misgivings about the destruction of the homeland, 
the danger to the drinking water supply, the unknown 
impacts on health, and even the total economic loss 
threatening those most affected» (ibid.). The economic 
argument in particular has two sides: on the one hand 
the feared devaluation of property (often the only sub-
stantial investment of local residents) along the planned 
grid corridor, and on the other the interests of big ener-
gy and transmission players and their investors. Two 
further passages present this argument powerfully:
We will continue to fight this monster grid corridor […] 
that threatens to destroy our natural environment, our 
homeland, the very basis of our lives, and in many cases 
our livelihoods. […] The main motive behind the planned 
corridor is to maximize profit for monopolists and lobby-
ists. We will not tolerate this at the cost of our health and 
landscape (ibid.). 
And, even more emphatically: «We will not per-
mit our health and landscape to be jeopardized so that 
coal-sourced power can be sold abroad and the profits 
of a few energy corporations and their investors maxi-
mized» (ibid.). Here the local environment and way 
of life, symbolized in an objectified landscape, are set 
against the national/international system of big business 
and its profiteers—a dichotomy that unites leftist with 
traditionalist critiques of capitalism (see Vicenzotti 2011; 
Kirchhoff and Trepl 2009; Kühne 2015; Bärsch 1981) and 
explicitly confronts an entrepreneurially organized ener-
gy transition with a conservative/neo-Marxist alliance. 
Significantly, a strategic shift in the argumenta-
tion of CIs – irrespective of their underlying motivation 
– took place when they realized the (lack of) impact of 
specific arguments. This cognitively based shift is dem-
onstrated in the following interview: «Landscape pro-
tection […] or the devaluation of property and related 
assets: these are arguments we have always proposed. 
But we have seen that they cut no ice with specialists or 
politicians» (CI-G interview). So «landscape aspects are 
still brought in», but no longer play a central role (ibid.). 
The central role is now a legal one, and what the law lis-
tens to is legal arguments based on nature and environ-
mental protection: e.g. «The planned measures acutely 
threaten and endanger sensitive, protected landscape 
and ecosystems» (CI-G website). The real interests and 
fears of the protagonists may be related to their social 
environment, but the conflict requires that their argu-
ments be legally cogent.
(2) Citizens for Transparency and Justice (Bavaria) 
CI against wind farm extension. In the context of wind 
generated energy, the economic argument on the one 
hand questions the legitimacy of central government 
subsidies for wind generated power and on the other 
solicits donations for the campaign against it, also citing 
the concepts of landscape and homeland:
There is heartbreaking evidence of people who have lost 
home and health […] We urgently need your help and soli-
darity to stop this crime against Germany, its citizens, and 
our homeland. We call on your trust: we have moral integ-
rity and decency on our side and we will use your dona-
tions conscientiously (CI-W website). 
The claim to defend the moral high-ground from the 
(political) adversary already suggests a conflict of high 
intensity (see Luhmann 1996, 2017 on «moral communi-
cation»), and the same tone pervades the argument from 
economics and health:
Financial greed is taking over and destroying our home-
land. What people in North Germany have already suffered 
now threatens us. The 10H rule [that wind turbines must 
always be at least 10 times their height away from dwell-
ings] is constantly abused and people are left to their fate. 
The politics of the Federal Coalition and the Green Party 
are responsible for the greatest threat to citizens’ health and 
property that Germany has undergone since WW2. Home-
land and nature are simply sacrificed to affluence. There 
are alternatives, but the wind-power lobby has politicians 
in a stranglehold (CI-W website). 
Another passage presents species protection as an 
argument for solar rather than wind power: «In con-
trast to photovoltaic arrays, wind turbines spell death to 
many birds, and destruction to the biodiversity of for-
ests, which they transform into an industrial landscape. 
Good-bye homeland!» (ibid.). Again, the concept of 
homeland as a living environment is seen as subjected to 
economic interests entailing «wide-scale destruction of 
landscape» (ibid.). The same essentialist interpretation of 
physical space in its interplay with humans is evident in 
an interview: «We’ve grown together with the landscape 
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and we need it like our daily bread» (CI-W interview). 
Another interviewee rejects wind turbines on both spa-
tial – for their impact on his own (vs. others’) living 
space – and economic grounds:
[…] we’re destroying something very important: our home-
land and landscape. ’Cos I don’t know if you’ve ever trave-
led through Northern Germany. I’ve often been up there, 
and you only have to hit the hills beyond Würzburg and 
you’ll get dizzy. There’s no landscape any longer you’d want 
to live in, and whatever’s made it like that is completely 
ignored by the other side – it runs into billions (ibid.). 
Finally, the migration of the rural population to the 
cities is linked with loss of the normative landscape of 
home: «So it’ll have a massive impact on the landscape 
and drive people into the cities» (ibid.) – the conflict, 
then, is not only intense, its outreach extends through-
out society.
THE INTERPRETATION OF LANDSCAPE CONFLICTS 
IN LIGHT OF DAHRENDORF’S CONFLICT THEORY
The issue immediately arising from these empirical 
findings is: What do they mean in Dahrendorf ’s terms 
and how can the conflict they enshrine be regulated? 
Social differentiation tends generally to increase the set 
of landscape conflicts, because it multiplies claims on 
physical space, as well as the patterns of logic, interpre-
tation and evaluation they generate. But conflict is a nor-
mal sign of the adaptability and dynamism of a devel-
oped democracy, and of its productivity in broadening 
the scope of its citizens’ opportunities.
The individual evaluative and interpretive patterns 
behind such normative concepts as homeland and ste-
reotypical landscapes are rooted in processes of sociali-
zation: the former in familiarization, from childhood 
on, with physical spaces and their symbolic and emotive 
connotations; the latter in corresponding familiarization 
with the aesthetic and cognitive attributions of school-
books, advertisements, films, Internet etc. (for further 
detail see e.g. Kühne 2008a, 2017a, 2018b; Nissen 1998; 
Stotten 2013; Proshansky, Fabian and Kaminoff 1983; 
Lyons 1983; Cosgrove 1993, 1998). Accordingly, any 
object seen as disrupting the homeland environment will 
be regarded automatically as transgressing the norm, 
whereas an object seen as disrupting a stereotypical 
landscape will only be so regarded if it contradicts ste-
reotypical social standards of beauty or appropriateness. 
If a wind farm, for example, is perceived as impacting 
one’s homeland, it will be rejected out of hand, because 
it creates obvious, irreversible change in the (emotion-
ally) unchangeable. If, however, it simply transgresses a 
(e.g.) West European stereotype, it may be perceived as 
ugly, but might also be seen as a modern cultural-tech-
nological enhancement of the landscape (Kühne 2018c). 
Here too, conflicts can be seen to have their roots in 
social attitudes of openness or resistance to change – 
whether in landscape as a social construct or as physi-
cal space. Such conflicts can vary in intensity accord-
ing to the size, influence, and networking (inter alia) of 
the affected groups. Disputes can range from academic 
debate about concepts of landscape (see e.g. Vicenzotti 
2011; Hokema 2013) to violent protest (as e.g. in the case 
of Stuttgart’s new train station). 
Democratic states by definition incorporate differ-
ent – at times conflicting – interests, and landscape is no 
exception. In Germany, the legal principle of balanced 
interests prescribes the participation of different parties in 
spatial planning (see Brenner 1997). To dissolve such con-
flicts altogether would entail the removal of their social 
cause, which would curtail the social dynamism that 
underlies landscape change in both its senses. Conflict 
may sometimes be avoided, for example by keeping envi-
ronmental change below the horizon of perception, or by 
camouflaging it – as in the new Los Angeles County Jail, 
which so cleverly fits its surroundings that it can be mis-
taken for an office block, shopping mall, or multi-story 
parking facility (see Kühne 2012, 2013; Weber 2017). 
Applied to the German energy transition, Dahren-
dorf ’s preferred solution, conflict regulation, entails:
1. mutual acceptance of standpoints as the expression 
of legitimate interests for/against physical manifesta-
tions of the energy transition;
2. focusing on concrete projects (grid corridors, wind 
farms), not on the underlying rationale of the energy 
transition;
3. compliance with procedural rules agreed by all par-
ties, with clear accountability for decisions;
4. organization of all parties, with legitimate, reliable 
spokespersons – for CIs often a challenge;
5. involvement of an independent arbitrator whose reg-
ulatory competence is accepted by all parties –  typi-
cally, for Dahrendorf (1991) as a liberal politician, 
the state.
Dahrendorf (1994: 69) further stipulates «the auton-
omy [in the sense of independence from a center of pow-
er] of the many institutions and organizations» involved 
– i.e. CIs should not, in landscape conflicts, serve as the 
mouthpiece of political parties. And he finally notes the 
need for politeness, tolerance, and non-violence in the 
conduct of debate (1994).
The actual course of landscape conflict (at least in 
Germany, but also in other parts of the world) is often 
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far removed from these requirements. At times neither 
party recognizes the legitimacy of the opposing stand-
point or of its representatives; the organization of the 
parties is often diffuse, with frequently changing rep-
resentatives; and the level of institutionalization – and 
even stability – of CIs varies widely. Given their funda-
mental difficulties in gaining recognition, CIs oppos-
ing planning measures at times resort to polarizing or 
moralizing argumentation that undermines fair play 
(see below). Moreover, the role of independent arbitrator 
cannot be played by the state (as Dahrendorf stipulates) 
when the state is itself a conflicting party – which is gen-
erally the case in the German energy transition. 
Finally, the legal framework of these disputes in 
Germany is unclear and open to interpretation. The very 
number of court cases dealing with the evaluation of 
landscapes shows that the concept of «natural beauty» 
– as protected by the Federal Nature Conservation Act 
– cannot, in a diversified society, be univocally defined 
(see e.g. Roth and Bruns 2016). Moreover, the accounta-
bility of decisions is often obscured by the tangled struc-
tures of political and administrative interests, as well as 
that of primary and secondary contestants – for exam-
ple when CIs opposing project companies and/or grid 
providers are joined by nature protection associations, 
sports clubs, local history and activities groups etc. (see 
Gailing 2015; Hoeft, Messinger-Zimmer and Zilles 2017; 
Walter et al. 2013; Weber et al. 2017a; Kühne and Weber 
2018 [online 2017]). Although the expanding educational 
opportunities of post-1960s Germany have undoubtedly 
heightened organizational competencies, with poten-
tially beneficial effect on conflict regulation, the increas-
ing differentiation of interests, from species and geotope 
protection through landscape aesthetics to the concerns 
of dog owners, kite f lyers, geo-cachers, bathers etc. 
thwarts efficient organization and the effective presenta-
tion of a case. Against this background the actual issue, 
the changing use of physical space, transmutes into an 
aesthetic, moral, political, and administrative nightmare. 
Hence the frequent appeal to the authority of the courts, 
which in principle contradicts Dahrendorf ’s idea of pro-
ductive conflict regulation.
A specific problem that often arises in landscape 
disputes is the claim (whether explicit or implicit) to 
possess moral, aesthetic, or otherwise evaluative truth. 
In the first place this fuses (or confuses) moral good-
ness and rectitude with evaluative goodness, in the 
sense of beauty or sublimity (Hofmann-Riedinger 2011: 
387), often against the horizon of individual aspira-
tions to the «good life» (eupraxia, Hubig 2007: 128) – a 
tendency already observed by Kant in the «ambiguity 
of the term GOOD» (Kant 1983 [1793]: 135) and read-
ily extendable to the ambiguity of the term «beautiful» 
with its parallel convergence of evaluative denotations. 
Then, too, along the lines of the classical ideal of per-
sonal conduct (kalokagathia), this melding of the good 
with the beautiful readily assimilates the third limb 
of the classical triad, truth, to establish an unreflected 
assumption of irrefutable argumentative superiority (see 
Max Weber 2011 [1919]; Habermas 1994: 183-184). In 
the landscape conflict, what is felt to be beautiful and 
good will soon be found right and true and will be pre-
sented as the better knowledge, a priori immune to dis-
senting critique, which will, conversely, be stigmatized 
as false, bad, and (in its preferred objects) ugly. And 
irrefutability is catching: if one side assumes it, both 
sides will. Polarization is then complete, the concept of 
fairness goes by the board, and any real chance of regu-
lating the conflict is lost. 
Calling on the tradition of Popper, Weber, and 
Kant, Dahrendorf reminds us, however, that human 
knowledge is fallible and incomplete: no one knows at 
any given historical moment whether a specific tenet 
is right or true. Dahrendorf speaks of the «enlightened 
skepticism of Immanuel Kant» (2004: 141) in the face of 
unconsidered or excessive claims to truth. After all, the 
human standpoint is finite and historical, its knowledge 
contingent and particular. Hence it is ill-considered to 
undermine the variety of convictions in an argument: it 
is the very breadth of different viewpoints that subjects 
one’s own beliefs to critique and potential change. What 
Max Weber calls «the polytheism of evaluative systems» 
(2011 [1919]) – or in general the pluralism of modern 
scientific and social discourse – should, with Dahren-
dorf, be seen as an integral aspect of Kant’s «faith in 
human ability to use [the faculty of] reason» (2004: 
328). All we can ever do is ensure «that error does not 
harden into dogma» (1984: 117). The irreducible uncer-
tainty of knowledge should not, however, prevent neces-
sary decisions; what it should prevent is the “quest for 
final solutions» (1965a: 197) or the absolute truths on 
which to rest them. Given the hypothetical status of its 
propositions, human argument, like human discourse, 
has its own «moral maxims […]: the conventions of sci-
ence, codes of political procedure, in general maxims of 
private and public behavior» (1972: 313), for «the ethics 
of uncertainty is the ethics of freedom, and the ethics of 
freedom is the ethics of conflict, of antagonism played 
out on a fair and level field» (1972: 313–314). Applied to 
landscape conflicts and their regulation, Dahrendorf ’s 
conflict theory can be considered «a stabilizing factor» 
(Mittelstrass 2004: 259) indicating pathways and offer-
ing methods of «practically applicable reflection» (Berr 
2018b: 50).
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CONCLUDING SUMMARY: PRODUCTIVE LANDSCAPE 
CONFLICTS, CHALLENGE AND OUTLOOK
How topical is Ralf Dahrendorf today, in 2019, 
ten years after his death? His conflict theory, we have 
argued, has both analytic and practical potential – 
the latter not least for the challenges it elaborates with 
respect to the regulation of present-day landscape con-
flicts (Kühne 2018a, 2018b; Kost 2013). These have to do, 
for example, with the increasing differentiation of soci-
ety, the expansion of educational opportunities, and the 
multiplication of interests that has inevitably followed, 
along with the enhanced ability to organize and articu-
late those interests. Specifically, landscape issues have 
tended to fragment, and the resultant micro-disputes 
have, at least initially, evinced relatively low intensity 
and little violence. However, given the level of social net-
working in our world, intensity as well as violence can 
quickly increase.
Dahrendorf rejects, as ill-befitting a democratic and 
pluralist society, the attempt either to suppress or to dis-
solve social conflicts: the former process disregards peo-
ple’s needs, convictions, and emotions and can only lead 
to violent eruptions; the latter disregards their diver-
sity and inevitably induces social leveling, and with it a 
lethargic uniformity. In contrast, Dahrendorf ’s preferred 
solution of conflict regulation does justice to the dyna-
mism and variety that is the life-blood of democracy 
(see Kamlage, Nanz and Fleischer 2014; Hülz and Kühne 
2015). In practice, however, this process must overcome 
some perceptible hurdles. Among these, in the case of 
landscape conflicts, are on the one hand lack of organi-
zational competence (paradoxically, the presence of a 
German umbrella organization of CIs against wind pow-
er tends to enhance rather than diminish the intensity of 
conflict), and on the other a predilection for moralistic 
polarizing of the issues and concomitant discrediting of 
the opposition in terms that can at times be distinctly 
unproductive (Spanier 2006; Kühne 2008c; Berr 2018a). 
It has even happened that advocates of a disputed energy 
measure, accused of being «destroyers of homeland and 
landscape», have turned on their adversaries as «destroy-
ers of the future of the human race» (see Kühne and 
Weber 2015; Renn 2012). 
Another difficulty is that both in ordinary speech 
and in legal terms the concept of landscape (whether ste-
reotypical or homeland), lacks specificity. German law 
does not define what the term «landscape» – let alone 
«beauty» – concretely means, and in practice the prob-
lem is, therefore, evaded by masking objections to plan-
ning measures in other terms, frequently, for example, 
the more clearly defined legal notion of species protec-
tion. That in many current disputes the German state is 
both protagonist and arbiter is, again, scarcely conducive 
to satisfactory conflict regulation.
Nevertheless, landscape conflicts can be seen, in 
light of Dahrendorf ’s theory and its prescriptions, as 
potentially productive for society. Above all, far from 
deviating from the normative construct of a «com-
mon social consensus», such conflicts demonstrate the 
engagement of a society in processes of development 
that will create continuous opportunities for its mem-
bers. This should be recognized by all parties to a con-
flict. In the landscape context this means that all par-
ties should acquaint themselves not only with the posi-
tion, reasoning, and values of their opponents, but also 
with their own automatic, unquestioned – what Berger 
and Luckmann (1966) call «sedimentary» – patterns 
of interpretation and evaluation (for greater detail see 
Kühne 2018b). This in turn presupposes the readiness 
of the conflicting parties not to claim moral superiority 
for their own position. Moreover, the regulation of con-
flicts calls, here too, for an institutional framework with 
concrete procedural goals and clear guidelines for their 
achievement. That this is not an appropriate matter for a 
court of law is demonstrated by the frequent cases deal-
ing – and doing so in standardized fashion – with the 
evaluation of landscapes. Such landscape assessment 
methods assume the possibility of using quasi-scientif-
ic quantifying methods to find the “correct” design or 
use of landscape for the particular purpose. Experi-
ence shows, however, that this merely leads to a leveling 
of landscapes (Körner 2006, Kühne 2018d) and their 
underlying individual and collective constructs, values, 
and convictions. Appealing to the courts in such mat-
ters amounts to suppressing the conflict, not regulating 
it, which in a pluralist 21st century society is an inad-
equate – not to say dysfunctional – approach to the 
problem. As the great social conflicts (e.g. the class con-
flict) gradually subside, the chances for successful con-
flict regulation in issues of use of space and landscape 
should in principle improve – so long as the arguments 
adduced on both sides remain on the factual level and 
there is a basic will to achieve agreement about what is 
to be done. However, this requires the development and 
institutionalization in Dahrendorf ’s sense of conflict 
resolution procedures that take into account both long-
standing democratic structures and human susceptibil-
ity to conflict and error. The authors of this article are 
united in their conviction that Dahrendorf ’s ideas and 
suggestions for a practicable implementation of this task 
are still applicable and available.  
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